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Abstract The  paper  represents  an attempt to determine the level of
fiscal deficit which does not require more financing than is
compatible with sustainable internal and external
borrowing, and which is consistent with the expected and
desirable levels of macroeconomic indicators, such as
economic growth and the rate of inflation. At the same time
it takes into account the existing foreign trade potentials of
the country as well as characteristics of foreign demand for
exports. Empirical analysis has shown that Croatia has
rather limited possibilities to finance its fiscal deficit.
Foreign debt financing is to a large extent constrained by
dynamics of exports, while the domestic debt financing is
limited by a relatively low rate of growth of domestic
economy. Financing through issuing money should be






A possibility of fiscal imbalance in the Republic of Croatia
has never been completely eliminated, and a seemingly balanced budget in
the last several years has been realised by, among other ways, including the
receipts from privatisation in the budget revenue and not in the sources for
financing excess of government expenditure over its revenue. Due to a
relative abundance of the receipts from privatisation there has not been a dire
need to assess capacity of financing fiscal deficit through the usual
instruments: domestic borrowing, foreign borrowing and money creation.
Since the capacity of financing through the privatisation of state portfolio has
decreased, and since there might be a decrease in tax burden with the same
level of state consumption, a question opens of how much fiscal deficit
Croatia can afford and what the possibilities there are to finance it from each
individual source. 
The paper deals with this question not dwelling on the
objective need of running a fiscal deficit, neither on the possible
consequences of fiscal imbalance. 
1.1 Analytical framework for
assessing the financeable
fiscal deficit
The method used in this paper for assessing the financeable
fiscal deficit in the Republic of Croatia is the one devised by Cohen (1988)
which he proposed as a tool for assessing a capacity of financing through
external debt, and which Anand and van Wijnbergen (1988) integrated into
the analysis of the overall capacity of financing fiscal deficit, i. e. financing a
deficit through revenue from monetisation, domestic debt and foreign debt.
The applied method views fiscal deficit as a part of an
overall macroeconomic picture and evaluates whether a deficit should be
"acceptable" in the context of macroeconomic policy targets. The method
tries to determine the level of fiscal deficit which is consistent with the
expected and desirable levels of macroeconomic indicators, such as economic
growth and the rate of inflation. At the same time it takes into account the
existing foreign trade potentials of the country as well as characteristics of




budget constraints and can be used to calculate the level of fiscal deficit that
can be financed with a given inflation, as well as to calculate the equilibrium
rate of inflation which does not require fiscal adjustment.
In accordance with the applied method the paper analyses
fiscal deficit which does not require more financing than is compatible with
sustainable external and internal borrowing, and with the existing targets for
price increase and the rate of economic growth. The method is attractive
since the model can encompass numerous factors which influence the need
for a fiscal reform and thereby the very capacity of maintaining a fiscal
balance. These factors, among others, are: reforms in financial sector which
change the demand for base money, interest rate on domestic and foreign
debt, a desirable rate of economic growth and exchange rate policy.
The model applied in this paper is based on public finance
approach to inflation (Phelps, 1973, among others). The inflation in this
model is explained as a residual tax, i.e. the tax that enables restoring a
balance between the planned public expenditures and revenues, from
traditional sources of taxation with efficient debt management. Inflation
operates as a tax since it forces the private sector to decrease expenditure in
order to be able to maintain the real value of money balances that it wants to
hold with a given structure of the yield. Inflation tax creates a wedge between
revenue and expenditure which is not compensated by any real accumulation
of assets, just like in any other form of taxation. This approach does not deny
the fact that in the short run there can be demand-push or cost-push factors
e.g. changes in the nominal exchange rate.
Fiscal approach to a sustained inflation came into focus
again after the influential article by Sargent and Wallace (1981). An
important component of their approach is sustainability. Sustainability of
inflation targets requires consistency between targeted rates of inflation and
implicit consequences of these rates on the revenues from inflation tax, on
the one hand, and on fiscal deficit, on the other. 










If we wanted to illustrate specific case of Croatia in more realistic way, this identity should be1
expanded by several more elements, primarily by privatisation revenues which should not be
ignored as an element of the public debt financing.
1.2 Fiscal deficit, money creation
and debt
The relation between fiscal deficit, money creation and debt




In this expression PB is the primary balance of the public
sector, i.e. non-interest deficit. The primary balance of the public sector is the
difference between the total public sector expenditures minus expenditures
for interest payments and the total public sector revenue (or, for the sake of
convenience - tax revenue). In other words, this is a conventional deficit
minus interest payments; i  is the nominal interest rate on domestic public
D
debt; i  is an interest rate on foreign public debt; B  is the level of public debt
L P
held by domestic private sector, and L  is the level of foreign net debt, or the
N
level of the external public debt minus Central Bank's net foreign assets. E
is the nominal exchange rate (e.g. kunas for dollars).
The left-hand side of the equation shows net expenses
(expenses - taxes) of the public sector. These expenses are to be financed
through issuing domestic or foreign debt or through money creation. The
primary deficit refers to the overall public sector (central government +
state-owned enterprises + local government + extra-budgetary funds + central
bank obligations).
As will be shown later, equation (1) was formed by
consolidating the identities of the public sector in its narrow sense (central
government + state-owned enterprises + local government + extra-budgetary
funds) and of the central bank identity. The starting point was the basic
identity of base money supply which comes out of the balance sheet of
monetary authorities. The balance sheet of monetary authorities is presented
in Figure 1.



















BALANCE SHEET OF MONETARY AUTHORITIES+
Assets Liabilities
foreign component                             E*F currency in circulation                        GOTC
claims on government                           B reserves held by commercial C
banks at the central bank                   REZ 
claims on commercial banks                 KC
MONETARY BASE MONETARY BASE
ON THE ORIGIN SIDE                         M ON THE USAGE SIDE                         M0 0
 Taken from Cath (1995)+
Foreign component (net foreign assets) is made up of net
foreign exchange reserves in gold and in foreign currency; claims on
government is made up of net borrowing of the local government from the
central bank in the form of direct loans and public debt which the central
bank buys on the open market; and claims on commercial banks, actually,
borrowings of financial institutions from the central bank, especially in the
form of refinancing and lombard credits. We shall here largely disregard the
part of monetary base which consists of direct loans to the public sector.
It comes out from the central bank balance sheet that every
change in the supply of base money appears as the result of one or more of
the following causes:
        - changes in net foreign assets at the Central bank (due to
foreign exchange transactions);
        - changes in the Central Bank advances to the public sector
(these changes occur through operations on the open
market and/or through direct loans to the public sector);
        - changes in net credit to financial institutions (e.g. through
direct loans to commercial banks).
Hence we can say that a change in the supply of base
money equals:
(2)
where  M  is the quantity of base money,  B  is the amount of government
0  C
bonds held by the central bank, K  is the loans from the central bank and F
C C
is the level of net foreign exchange reserves of the central bank.
The budget constraint of the public sector is:
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where B  is the total public debt, domestic and foreign, P(G + I  - T) is the
T  G
nominal primary deficit, i.e. the difference between nominal expenditure for
consumption and investments, and the nominal tax revenues. It is assumed
here, which has to be particularly stressed, that the total external debt is the
public sector debt. In reality public sector debt is only just a part of external
debt. However, the assumption of equivalence between foreign public debt
and external debt is justified since it is often considered that the state will
cover the liabilities of the private sector if they are not covered by the private
sector debtors themselves. L is the level of external debt. The expression
shows that the domestic public debt is divided into the public debt held by
the central bank and the public debt held by the private sector.
Thus a change of the public debt held by the central bank
can be expressed as:
(4)
It is assumed that the interest rate on domestic and foreign
public debt is equal regardless whether the government borrows from the
central bank or from the private sector.
When (2) is included in (4) and solved for  
we arrive at the expression which shows possible ways of financing the public
sector deficit. The change in the base money supply which arises from direct
loans to commercial sector will be left out from the equation for the sake of
convenience.
(5)
The equation points to the conclusion that the public sector
deficit, i.e. the change in the level of the total public debt, can be financed
through the issue of primary money, through borrowings from domestic
private sector, through foreign borrowings and through (a decrease in) the
central bank foreign exchange reserves. It can be noted that only the
monetary base can be considered as a source of deficit financing, and not the
entire money supply. Namely, the increase in money supply which causes
inflation generates the inflation revenue for the country which is equal to the
losses of other sectors due to a decline in the real value of their money
holdings (cash and deposit money). However, the government revenue
generated by inflationary erosion of the private sector deposits, which is, on
the other hand, compensated by inflationary erosion of the private sector
P G I T i B B i L E
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loans that are not repaid, does not increase the public sector net revenue.
That is why a country's net revenues are created only through an increase in
monetary base.
By combining expression (5) with the budget constraint of
the public sector (3) we can write as follows:
(6)
For expression (6) to become the equation of budget
constraints of the entire public sector, where the entire public sector consists
of the public sector in narrow sense (nonfinancial public sector) and the
central bank (financial public sector), expression (6) is to be consolidated.
This means that the profit and loss account of the central bank has to be
included into the public sector in its narrow sense. To simplify the equation
it will be assumed that the central bank's profit is made up only of interests
on foreign exchange reserves, and it is also assumed that the interest rates on
foreign exchange reserves equal interest rates on foreign public debt.
Furthermore, since interest rates on public debt are, on the one hand, public
sector expenses in the narrow sense, and on the other hand, the revenue of
the central bank, they do not appear as an element of cost in the
consolidation on the right hand side of expression (6).
Thus the budgetary constraint of the consolidated public
sector can be expressed as follows:
(7)
When the consolidated public sector is looked at, then
foreign public debt should also be taken in its net amount, i.e. foreign public
debt should be decreased by the amount of foreign exchange reserve of the
central bank. Namely, if all central bank liabilities (base money, i.e. currency
in circulation increased by net reserves held by commercial institutions at the
central bank) are taken as public sector liabilities, the central bank assets that
refer to the claims on non-government domestic sectors, should be





Expression (1) is, in fact, expression (8) but shown in a
shorter form.
When expression (8) is shown in real terms, then the link
between the net public sector claims and the increase in the real value of
domestic and foreign debt, i.e. between net claims of the public sector and
the money creation, and thereby the inflation - becomes more obvious. For
the convenience sake, it will be assumed that the inflation rate abroad equals
zero, and for the sake of transparency the real deficit of the public sector in
the narrow sense will be defined as D = (G + I  - T) + i B /P + i L e i.e. as
G D P L N
D = (G + I  - T) + r B  + r L e,  where r  and r  are real interest rates on
G D P L N  D  L
domestic and foreign public debt, and e is the real exchange rate. Hence it
holds that: 
(9)                  D = )B/P + )L e + )M /P =
t t t
N 0
    = )B/P + )L e + )M  + BM ,
t
N 0R 0R
where M  is real base money supply (M  = M /P), and B is the inflation
0R  0R  0
t t t
rate in the country, defined as B = (P  - P )/P  . The sum of )M  + BM
t t-1 t
0R 0R
gives the total revenue from monetisation, which consists of seigniorage
)M  and inflation tax BM .
0R 0R
Expression (9) says that the real deficit of the consolidated
public sector equals the sum total of the change (increase) in real value of
domestic and foreign debt, and of the monetisation revenue. It should be
added here that apart from the two stated sources of monetisation
(seigniorage and inflation tax), there are other sources like single changes in
the real money supply due to the changes in inflation and interest, or similar
one-off changes caused by financial innovations which change demand for
money.
Equation (9) which is derived here, shows, in fact, only
computational identities. However, it is the base for a large part of the
analysis which will be performed here. Demand for money can be influenced
by macroeconomic variables like economic growth and inflation. In the same
way, the changes in financial structure and in regulations can impact the
expected level of revenue from monetisation. Finally, a debt issue is restricted
by both creditworthiness and sustainability. All of these restrictions can be




1.3 Revenue from monetisation
To analyse determinants of demand for base money, it will
be assumed that base money is the function of inflation rate as well as of
interest rates on demand deposits and time deposits. Thus the demand for
primary money M  is:
0
    M /(PY) = f (B, i , i ) (10)
0 DV DO
Primary money is shown here as a proportion of the
nominal GDP, which is marked here with PY. A more complex financial
structure would include additional factors as well, such as exchange rate and
interest rate on foreign currency deposits. 
Expression (10) can be used to calculate the impact of
changes in inflation rates and in interest rates on the base money demand,
and a probable impact of these changes on the revenue which the public
sector can expect from monetisation. When this information is linked with
equation (9), then the fiscal consequences of inflation can be assessed.
1.4 Creditworthiness and the limits
to the public debt issue
The important elements which determine a consistent fiscal
policy are cost and availability (possibility) of financing abroad. The needed
amount of financing depends on the cost of the existing foreign debt, r L e.
L N
Besides, for any given level of the total revenue requirements, the amount
which should be paid from domestic sources depends on the amount of
foreign financing L e that is desired or available. 
N
While assessing a country's capacity for foreign borrowing
two elements have to be taken into account: solvency and creditworthiness.
Solvency is, in fact, the capacity for servicing a debt, which means that it
depends on the non-income current account of the balance of payments; on
the real interest rate; on its relation to the growth rate of output; and, of
course, on the initial level of debt. Solvency is considered threatened if the
discounted value of expected minimal present and future consumption is
bigger than the value of present wealth net of foreign debt. To be able to
assess solvency, it is necessary to calculate the discounted value of present and
future feasible trade surpluses, and to compare this value with the present




When the real rate of economic growth is negative, as was the case in the Republic of Croatia2
in 1999, then, of course, the problem of insolvency occurs at any positive real interest rate on
public debt.
foreign debt grows at the smaller rate than is the rate of interest on that debt
(van Wijnbergen, 1990). Such assessments show that in the largest number
of debtor countries today their solvency is not challenged .
2
Still, even when solvency is not a constraint, a constraint can
be creditworthiness. Creditworthiness depends on perception of creditors
about the capacity and willingness of a country to pay its debt. However it is
difficult to assess the precise limits imposed by the creditworthiness
constraints. According to Cohen (1988), a country would not stop servicing
its debt if, according to its estimate, a cost of default were smaller than the
present cost of servicing the debt. Countries decide on the benefits of defaults
and on the damage that the cost of debt repayment inflicts, on the basis on
difference between the actual debt burden and the acceptable benchmark.
Thus a common definition of "prudent" borrowing strategy is the one which
will never raise debt service burden above its present level. This implies that
the very fact a country runs a trade surplus does not automatically mean it
runs a prudent debt policy.
Besides the problem of setting a limit to borrowing, the
problem of defining a debt burden emerges. Servicing a debt not only
requires the sufficient level of wealth, but also the long-lasting positive
difference between the production of tradable goods and the consumption
of tradable goods (net exports). It is more difficult to realise positive net
exports in the country in which a larger part of resources are employed in
nontradable sector of goods than in the open economy. However, if this is
more difficult to be realised, there will be an ever-greater urge not to repay
the debt, even if the solvency criterion is met. In this sense the relation
between debt and exports is important for the evaluation of creditworthiness.
However, even though the debt/exports ratio is an important indicator, it is
a biased estimate of a country's debt ratio in relation to its production of
tradable goods. Namely, some tradable goods that are produced in the
country are sold on the domestic market. If, on the other hand, the
debt/output ratio is chosen as an indicator of debt burden, then the real debt
burden would be underestimated since output (gross domestic product) also
includes the non-tradable goods.
According to Cohen (1988) foreign creditors find that a
vital characteristic of the creditworthiness is the amount of resources that can
be channelled onto the world market and exchanged for "hard" currency.




and imports are too narrow a measure of debt servicing capacity.
Traditionally, the size of the tradable sector has been considered as an
appropriate measure, but it can turn out that the choice of this measure stems
from short-termism in viewing the situation, since in the long run human and
technological resources can move from the production of nontradable goods
into the production of tradable goods. If the borrowing strategy were based
on GDP as a measure of debt servicing capacity, that would lead to
implementing a wrong policy, since the borrowing country would be
stimulated to appreciate its currency so as to artificially increase the dollar
value of its GDP. On the other hand, if the lending policy of the creditor
were based only on exports, that could bring the debtor country to devaluate
in order to stimulate exports, and the measure of wealth would again be
distorted. Two biases which come out from the use of only one measure of
wealth (or resources) have the opposite sign. This creates the need to choose
the measure of wealth that would not depend on the exchange rate
movements. 
The invariant measure of wealth would thus be the linear
combination of these two debt service measures which would not change
with the changes in real exchange rates. That is why Anand and van
Wijnbergen (1988) use weighted average of debt/output ratio, and
debt/export ratio R*. In this case R* is the objectified measure of ability to
service external debt, which does not rely on output only, nor only on
exports, and can be expressed as follows:
 
      R* = (X* + (1-() Y*. (11)
In expression (11) X* indicates the value of exports, while
Y shows the value of domestic output expressed in the units of foreign goods,
i.e. X*=X/e, Y* = Y/e.
In choosing the weights Anand and van Wijnbergen (1988)
use the approach proposed by Cohen (1988). Cohen proposes that weights
are constructed in the way that leaves no incentive to create a wedge between
the real and social costs of foreign exchange, at least as far as assessment of
creditworthiness is concerned. The measure of R* should thus be designed
in such a way that every improvement of debt/output ratio, which results
from the real appreciation, is compensated by equal or negative impact of the
real appreciation on the debt/export ratio. This implies that dR*/de = 0, i.e.
that R* is such a measure which does nor react to real depreciation. Hence
a  question  of  how to choose the weight for export ( for which (dX*/de =
- (1 - ()dY*/de holds. To choose such ( at which R* does not depend on the
























































The following expression for weight ( is:
(13)
Here g  is the output elasticity with respect to the change
Y*,e
in the real exchange rate, g  is the export elasticity with respect to the
X*,e
change in the real exchange rate, and n is the proportion of goods export in
foreign currency, in the output in foreign currency (X*/Y*).
The acceptable external debt strategy that would allow the
debt service, and hence the credibility level to be maintained at least on the
present level, requires a dynamics of debt which will not lead to the increase
in the B*/R* ratio. To simplify let us say that the rate of growth of resources
R* is marked with n  , so we get that:
R
(14)
where the nX* growth rate is the export growth rate (dX*/X*), and n  is the
Y*
output growth rate (dY*/Y*). The n  rate can be linked to the output growth
X*
rate in the countries into which the goods are exported. The output growth
rate in these countries is marked with n*.
 
(15)            n  = g  n*
X* X*,Y*
Here the g  is the export elasticity (in foreign currency)
X*,Y*
with respect to the output of the countries into which the goods are exported.
When we take into account that the proportion of debt in
the resources R* should not be changed if the debt strategy is to be
considered acceptable, we get the following expression for the external debt
accumulation, expressed as a percentage of GDP:
(16)
Equations (14-16) can be applied in empirical research
once different elasticities have been estimated.
PSD d r b r L e nb n L nm mD L N R




For solvency approach as a method of evaluating the sustainability of public debt see, for3
example, Blanchard et al. (1990), Heinemann (1992), Institut "Finanzen und Steuern" (1993),
Rolf (1996).
1.5 Creating a consistent fiscal policy
A consistent fiscal policy is such a policy that can be
sustained in the medium-term period without jeopardising macroeconomic
targets. Also, if a fiscal policy is consistent, then there is no need for
unsustainable forms of debt financing. Unsustainable debt financing is such
a debt financing where the growth rate of indebtedness is higher than the
rate of increase in the resources available for debt servicing. This is a more
restrictive requirement than the solvency, according to which the average real
interest rate on the existing public debt should be lower than the real rate of
economic growth . 
3
If we assume that R* is the resource base for financing
external debt, and the domestic output y is a resource base for financing the
internal debt, we see the following constraints in debt issuing:
)B/P = nB/P, )L = n  L , (17)
N N
R
where n is the growth rate of the domestic output. If these constraints are
interpolated in debt issue equation (9), and if variables are expressed as a
percentage of GDP, then the following expression shows the deficit decrease
necessary for achieving a consistent fiscal policy:
(18)
i.e. the deficit reduction needed = (real primary deficit + interests) - deficit
which can be financed by overall resources available for financing the
external debt).
In expression (18) small letters denote variables expressed
as a portion of GDP.
The decrease in deficit which equals the necessary decrease
in deficit PSD will match the fiscal deficit with other macroeconomic target
variables. Alternatively, equation (18) can be used to calculate the
"sustainable" inflation rate. In that case PSD is simply equalised with the
present deficit and the rate of inflation is looked for at which the two sides





It should be noted that, when R* is used as the base for
setting the limits of the external debt accumulation, the real change in
exchange rate (appreciation), necessary to achieve the equilibrium of the
foreign trade balance, does not affect the fiscal balance. However, the
situation would be different if either exports or output were used as the only
base for determining the debt capacity. If the debt/output ratio were
considered, the real depreciation would increase the needed decrease in
deficit, i. e. decrease the room for a fiscal expansion. If, on the other hand,
the debt/exports ratio is considered, the real depreciation would diminish the
fiscal adjustment requirement if export elasticity in terms of the real exchange
rate were bigger than 1. On the contrary, if external debt capacity is
determined on the basis of ratio which has a combination of input and output
in its denominator, then depreciation does not impact the ratio. Higher costs
of debt servicing caused by depreciation, i.e. the growth of external
debt/output ratio are offset by additional capacity to issue foreign debt, i.e. by
a decrease in foreign debt/export ratio.
2
ASSESSMENT OF THE SIZE OF THE FINANCEABLE
DEFICIT IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
2.1 Demand for base money
in the Republic of Croatia
Base money in the Republic of Croatia consists of two basic
components: the currency outside banks and the reserves by commercial
banks held at the central bank. In the last five years the average reserve
requirement rate was between 26 and 32 percent of the sum of deposit
money, savings and term deposits. A functional relation can be noticed
between the money supply and primary money, which justifies the base
money equation estimation analogously with the estimation of money supply
equation.
In this paper the usual techniques for estimating money
demand functions are being applied. It is also assumed that the level of base
money is the function of income, of inflation rate, of the appropriate
component of base money in the previous period, and of the interest rates on




opportunity cost of holding money (A. Babić, 1999, Anušić, 1994).
The following variables were used in econometric estimate
of the base money demand function:
RM real base money at the end of the period. Real values were
obtained by using an implicit deflator P based on the retail
t
price index, and logRM=ln(M/P).
t
INFLA coefficient of change of the quarterly implicit deflator, and
logINFLA=ln(1+B)=ln[1+(P-P )/P ].
t t-1 t 
Y gross domestic product in constant (1990) prices.
IDV weighted average coefficient of interest on kuna demand
and term deposits at commercial banks, and
logIDV=ln(1+i ),  where  i   is  an  annualised  nominal
dv dv
weighted average interest rate on kuna demand deposits.
IDO weighted average coefficient of interest on kuna savings
and term deposits at commercial banks, and
logIDO=ln(1+i ),  where  i   is  an  annualised  nominal
do do
weighted average interest rate on kuna savings and term
deposits.
IDEP weighted average coefficient of interest on the total kuna
deposits at commercial banks, and logIDEP=ln(1+i ),
dep
where i  is an annualised nominal weighted average
dep
interest rate on the total kuna deposits.
DUMQ_YY dummy variables (where Q marks a quarter, and YY a
year).
All equations were estimated by using the method of
ordinary least squares. To avoid big oscillations of monthly data, quarterly
figures were used. Equations are estimated for the period of the first quarter
1994 to the fourth quarter 1998. The period before 1994 was not
considered since a very high inflation in that period heavily influenced the
form of money demand function, which changed after the introduction of the
stabilisation programme at the end of 1993 and after the inflation had been
checked.
The equations were estimated in the logarithm form, which
is very practical since in that case the parameter values match the elasticities
of dependent variables with respect to the explanatory variables. On the other
hand, the problem of using equation parameters in the logarithm form of
elasticities stems from the fact that it implicitly assumes a constant elasticity
which need not hold in reality.
RM RM Y INFLA IDV IDO DUMt t t t t t= −α ε
α α α α α α
1




Very similar results were obtained when we used the inflation and opportunity cost variables4
expressed in the form of a rate instead of a coefficient (equation 5, Table D1). However, in the
final selection of the equation for the base money demand we decided on the equation whose
variables are in the form of a coefficient since it captured a longer time period. Namely, due
to negative inflation rates in the first two quarters of 1994, it was not possible to carry out the
logarithm transformation of such a pronounced inflation variable in that period.
The estimated equations for primary money demand can
be found in Table D1 in the Annex.
Here is the model of money demand for which regression
coefficients were econometrically estimated:
(19)
The estimate of base money demand for the 1994:1 - 1998:
IV period yielded the following : 
4
logRM = -6.20 + 0.43logRM  + 1.06logY + 3.87logINFLA - 10.86logIDV +
t t-1 t
 (-4.02) (7.89)              (6.46)         (3.90)                (-4.52)
(20)
+ 3.51logIDO + 0.16DUM3_95
  (4.66)             (5.33)
R  = 0.9951; RKOR  = 0.9926; F = 403.19; DW = 2.26, h test = -0.007. 
2 2
It is obvious that the estimated equation has the
characteristics of a good econometric estimate. Values of R-squared and the
adjusted R-squared are high and show that the portion of the non-explained
variance of base money demand is below 1 percent. The standard error of
estimate is 2.7 percent which is low, and the specification validity of base
money demand equation is also proved by a high value of F statistic of
403.19. Durbin-Watson test does not indicate whether the hypothesis of
absence of autoregression can be accepted or not. Namely, the corresponding
values of d  and d  are 0.649 and 2.206, hence Durbin-Watson statistic lies
L U
in the indefinite area. Since Durbin-Watson test is not appropriate for testing
the absence of autoregression when one of the independent variables is a
lagged dependent variable, an h test was performed (Kmenta 1997). This test
showed that the hypothesis of D=0 can be accepted since the test value on
which the test is based is smaller than the critical value t  which is 1.753
12
with the 5 percent probability level.
Coefficients of all the variables have high values of t statistic,
i. e. the hypothesis that regression coefficients do not significantly differ from




variable logRM  is 0.43 and does not indicate a high degree of inertia in the
t-1
base money demand. Coefficient of the economic activity variable, which also
shows the income elasticity of primary money demand is very high and
amounts to 1.06. By decomposing this coefficient we come to income
elasticity of the desired level of base money holdings, which is 1.85 and this
is by far higher than the theoretical level of this coefficient which lies
between 0.5 and 1. Such a high coefficient level of economic activity variable
points to a low level of efficiency in monetary operations.
It is interesting to note that the estimated regressions have
shown a positive correlation between inflation and demand for the money
supply. (Equation 5 in Table D1 shows that the 1 percent increase in the
inflation rate results in the increase of the real monetary base of 0.04
percent). This means that in today's conditions it is possible to increase
inflation, and in that way realise monotonously increasing real revenue from
the inflation tax, and hence from monetisation as well. The equation yielded
such results because in the reviewed period the inflation rate was relatively
low (a quarterly inflation rate reached the values between -2.7 and 3.1
percent, with the median value of 0.7 percent). However, the experience
before the introduction of the stabilisation programme at the end of 1993,
when the monthly inflation rate reached 35 percent, showed that in such
conditions demand for money takes Cagan's form of money demand in
hyperinflationary conditions. The research showed that there was the
inflation rate which maximised the revenue from monetisation, and that
particular rate was about 175 percent monthly (Anušić and Švaljek, 1995).
Thus we can assume that in the situation of a new inflation increase in the
economy, the demand equation for monetary base would again change its
form. We can thus suppose that there would again be a certain inflation rate
after which the real revenues from inflation tax would start to decline.
By inserting different inflation rates into equation (20) the
real amounts of money supply were obtained in the time t+1 assuming that
other variables will not change. Then, on the basis of these amounts of real
money supply the proportion of real money supply in the annual GDP is
calculated, where the assumed level of real GDP equals the level realised in
1998. These proportions of money supply in GDP were used to calculate the
possible inflation tax revenue. In accordance with equation (20) this revenue
was calculated as a multiplication product of the inflation rate and real
monetary base. The results of this simulation of feasible real revenue from the
inflation tax are shown in column 2, Table 1. We see that with the quarterly
inflation rate within the interval of -6 to 32 percent, with the given form of
base money demand function, the inflation tax of -0.28 to 5.64 percent of




This assumption does not correspond with reality since in the Republic of Croatia the Croatian5
National Bank pays a remuneration at 4.5-5.5% rate.
After that a potential government revenue from seigniorage
was calculated. Segniorage was calculated as the change in the real value of
monetary base in the period t+1 in relation to the period t. The seigniorage
revenue is also shown in the form of annualised proportion in GDP. With
the inflation rates that existed in the past five-year period (between -2 and 4
percent quarterly) only between -0.93 and 0.90 percent of annual GDP can
be collected through monetisation. As we can notice from this table, with the
increase of the inflation rate the monetisation revenue rises up to very
attractive levels of, e.g. 16.86 percent a month, or 67 percent annually, with
the quarterly rate of 32 percent (which is equivalent to the annual price
increase of more than 200 percent.) However, a word of caution here:
revenue amounts calculated in this way should be understood as the upper
limit of revenue at the given inflation rate. Namely, this way of calculating
the monetisation revenue assumes that the central bank realises the maximum
possible amount of the seigniorage; that the central bank has no additional
costs to meet; that the central bank pays no interest on required reserve held
in its accounts ; and that the central bank transfers the total amount of the
5
seigniorage to the government budget. None of these assumptions is realistic,
which is shown in the data that in 1998 the government realised the revenue
from seigniorage in the amount of 351,134 kunas or of about 0,25 percent
of GDP, while, as shown in the calculation, with the existing monetary base
the seigniorage revenue could be double, 0.52 percent of GDP. We can also
say that with the rise in inflation rate the base money demand equation
would change and the real demand for money would be a negative function
of the inflation rate.
For the same reason, the quarterly inflation tax revenue of
5.64 percent of GDP, at the quarterly inflation rate of 32 percent, is most
probably unfeasible. Due to such a high inflation rate the real demand for
base money, the basis for the inflation tax, would decrease since the
population would hold the money for shorter periods of time (and the
velocity of money would increase). At the same time it is certain that the
demonetisation process would reappear, since the population would try to






INFLATION TAX, SEIGNIORAGE AND THE TOTAL REVENUE
FROM MONETISATION (IN % OF GDP) 
Inflation rate (%) Inflation tax Seigniorage Total revenue from monetisation
1 2 3 4 = 2 + 3
-6 -0.28  -1.65  -1.93
-4 -0.21  -1.25  -1.45
-2 -0.11  -0.82  -0.93
0 0.00  -0.37  -0.37
2 0.13   0.11   0.24
4 0.28   0.62   0.90
6 0.45   1.15   1.61
8 0.65   1.72   2.37
10  0.87   2.32   3.19
12  1.12   2.94   4.06
14  1.40   3.60   5.00
16  1.71   4.30   6.01
18  2.05   5.03   7.08
20  2.44   5.80   8.23
22  2.86   6.60   9.46
24  3.32   7.44 10.76
26  3.83   8.33 12.15
28  4.38   9.25 13.63
30  4.98 10.22 15.20
32  5.64 11.23 16.86
2.2 Export demand elasticity
To estimate the elasticity of domestic export with respect
to foreign demand and real exchange rate, the export demand function has
to be estimated first. Many practical problems occur in econometric
estimation of the export demand function of the Republic of Croatia when
a conventional model is used, the one in the output level in potentially
importing regions, the price levels of exporting goods, and the price levels of
imperfect export goods substitutes for export goods on the import market are
the basic explanatory variable. Discouraged by these problems some
researchers questioned the very possibility of applying this type of analysis,
as well as possible results of econometric estimate of export function in the
Republic of Croatia (Drinovac, Vujčić and Galinac, 1997).
Among numerous practical problems of such estimation, the
following need to be singled out. Firstly, in the last dozen of years after the
country gained independence, the structure of Croatia's export has
significantly changed in relation to importing countries. Hence it is very




To illustrate this, in 1998 52 percent of Croatia's exports went into OECD countries, 49.56
percent into European OECD countries, 47.6 percent into EU countries, and 40 percent of the
Croatia's exports went to Germany, Italy and Austria combined.
demand function by regions. It should also be pointed out that the time series
of methodologically comparable data are relatively short, since trade figures
with the countries of former Yugoslavia are available only since 1992.
The second problem of estimating the export demand
function appears due to the lack of statistics on import and export prices. This
is why, first of all, the value of exports is shown in current American dollars
and not in constant prices. Also, the lack of statistics on import and export
prices does not allow the use of relative price of exports of the Republic of
Croatia as an explanatory demand variable, in terms of aggregate index of
import prices or aggregate index of domestic prices in the countries into
which Croatia is exporting. Thus the alternative explanatory variable is the
index of real effective exchange rate. 
The third problem stems from the lack of reliable data on
gross domestic product of some countries into which the Republic of Croatia
has been exporting a large part of its total exports in the last several years. It
is primarily the countries of former Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia and
Herzegovina to which, in 1998, for example, about 14 percent of total
exports of the Republic of Croatia was directed. Therefore we shall estimate
export demand as a proxy variable that shows a foreign demand for Croatian
exports, by using imports, i.e. gross domestic product of OECD member
countries, and alternatively, imports, i.e. gross domestic product of three
groups of European countries: European OECD member countries; EU
member countries; and the group which includes Italy, Germany and
Austria . Additional problem in estimating and interpreting the results is that
6
there are no original data on imports and gross domestic products for these
groups of countries, but only seasonally adjusted quarterly ones, which, to
some extent, lessens the reliability of the achieved results.
Finally, the export function shows significant oscillations
because of which it is difficult to provide their econometric explanation. A
high portion of ship exports within total exports is one of the reasons for
oscillations. Shipbuilding is characterised by long production cycles and big
cyclical fluctuations on the ship market. Since ship exports account for an
important part of the total exports, the cycles have a strong impact on the
total exports of the Republic of Croatia. The problem could be avoided by
excluding the ship exports from the total exports, but since the beginning of
1997 when a uniform classification was abandoned in favour of national




shipbuilding can not be excluded from it as a separate industry. Furthermore,
in the last dozen of years political factors have also had an impact on demand
for Croatian export products (again, the strongest impact has been felt in
shipbuilding), not only because of war risks, but because Croatia has been
lagging behind in joining European integration processes which has
prompted the EU trade to turn to the CEFTA countries. Another reason
involves relations with the countries of former Yugoslavia and the regulation
of foreign trade with the countries of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia and SR Yugoslavia).
Owing to the above stated problems, the results of the
export demand equation estimate of the Republic of Croatia have to be taken
with a great deal of caution and critically examined. 
The export demand of the Republic of Croatia is estimated
here using a conventional model. To achieve a greater reliability in estimating
regression coefficients, and thereby the values of partial elasticities needed to
calculate acceptable foreign debt, we run a number of different regressions
in order to estimate the export demand function. Imports and gross domestic
product of importing countries are used as alternative variables representing
export demand. Apart from imports and gross domestic products other
explanatory variables used here are the index of real effective exchange rate
and the Deutch Mark (DM) exchange rate in relation to American dollar.
Although the conventional model for estimating the export demand equation
does not comprise the coefficient of DM exchange rate to American dollar,
it is still incorporated in the estimate. Empirical research has shown its large
significance in explaining export demand variations. Logical grounds for
including this coefficient are underpinned by the fact that it can explain the
part of dependent variable which results from changes in the relation of DM
to American dollar. Official statistics publish data on foreign trade in
American dollars, while a large part of foreign trade deals are concluded in
Deutch Marks. That is why changes in the relation between these two
currencies, with all other conditions unchanged, alter the exports figures
published in official statistics (Mervar, 1993). It can be expected that the
coefficient of DM to American dollar in export demand equation will have
a negative sign, since depreciation of DM to American dollar causes a fall in
the value of Croatian exports expressed in American dollars.





IZVOZ exports of the Republic of Croatia in millions of US dollars.
BDP1 gross domestic product of OECD member countries in
billions of US dollars, at 1990 constant prices, seasonally
adjusted data.
BDP2 gross domestic product of European OECD member
countries, in billions of US dollars, at 1990 constant prices,
seasonally adjusted data.
BDP3 gross domestic product of 15 EU member countries, in
billions of US dollars, at 1990 constant prices, seasonally
adjusted data.
BDP4 gross domestic product of 15 EU member countries, in
billions of ECUs, at 1990 constant prices, seasonally
adjusted data.
BDPIDA gross domestic product of Italy, Germany and Austria, in
billions of ECUs, at 1990 constant prices, seasonally
adjusted data.
UVOZ1 imports of goods and services of OECD member countries,
in billions of US dollars, at 1990 constant prices, seasonally
adjusted data.
UVOZ2 imports of goods and services of European OECD member
countries, at 1990 constant prices, seasonally adjusted data.
UVOZ3 imports of goods and services of 15 EU countries, in
billions of US dollars, at 1990 constant 1990 prices,
seasonally adjusted data.
UVOZ4 imports of goods and services of 15 EU countries, in
billions of ECUs, at 1990 constant prices, seasonally
adjusted data.
UVOZIDA imports of goods and services of Italy, Germany and
Austria, in billions of ECUs, at 1990 constant prices,
seasonally adjusted data.
IRET index of real effective exchange rate of kuna, based on the
industrial products' producer prices. 
DEMDOL rate of exchange of the Deutch Mark against the US dollar.
TIME trend variable.





DUMQ_YY dummy variables (where Q marks a quarter, and YY a
year).
Variants of econometric estimates of the export demand
equation are given at the end of this chapter in tables D2 and D3. All
equations were estimated by using the method of ordinary least squares. The
logarithm transformation was carried out so that regression coefficients can
be interpreted as partial elasticities. The estimates refer to the period of
1991:1 to 1998:3, except the estimates where imports are used as an
explanatory variable for export demand, i.e. gross domestic product of
European Union countries, in millions of ECUs, in the period between
1992:1 and 1998:4.
The estimate of equation 1 in Table D2 can be selected as
the one with the best characteristics. It has the following form:
logIZVOZ = - 6.83 + 1.32 logBDP1 + 0.34logIRET - 0.92logDEMDOL - 
      (-1.07)  (2.17)                (2.10)              (-3.38)
(21)
      - 0.33DUM1_93 - 0.42DUM1_94 + 0.25DUM3_94
      (-3.54)                (-4.12)                  (2.75)
R =0.78; RKOR =0.72; F=12.15; DW=1.89
2 2
R-squared and the adjusted R-squared show that the
changes in chosen explanatory variables can explain more than 78 percent
and 72 percent respectively of export variances of the Republic of Croatia.
All the coefficient estimates in the estimated demand equation have the
expected direction, and t-tests show that the values of coefficients significantly
differ from zero at 95 percent probability level, except for the coefficient of
the constant which shows that there is no autonomous part of exports. The
calculated F value of 12.15 indicates there is a relationship between the
dependent variable and explanatory variables, since it is bigger than the
critical value for F  at 5 percent significance level, which is 2.49.
6,21
Durbin-Watson statistic shows that the hypothesis of no correlation between
residuals can be accepted with 2.5 percent probability, since with that
probability level d  value is 1.85.
U
At the same time this equation gives the sought partial
export elasticities with respect to the exchange rate and demand of import
countries. According to the estimated equation of export demand, export
elasticity of the Republic of Croatia with respect to the real effective exchange
rate, E  is 0.34. This means that the increase in the index of the real
x*,e




by 1 percent, causes the increase in exports, expressed in American dollars,
by 0.34 percent, with other conditions unchanged.
To calculate the level of acceptable foreign debt by using
this theoretical framework we need to see the elasticity of domestic real
output with respect to the real effective rate of exchange. This elasticity is
obtained through a simple estimation of the correlation between domestic
output and the real effective rate of exchange. Econometric estimation yields
the following:
(22)                            logY = 11.95 - 0.26 logIRET + 0.01 TIME
                                    (34.22) (-3.58)             (10.02)
R  = 0.83; RKOR  = 0.82; DW = 1.626; F = 62.05
2 2
This estimation also has the sufficient power to explain the
variances of the dependent variable. The values of t-tests show that the
hypothesis which suggests that parameters significantly differ from zero can
not be accepted. Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there is no problem
of autocorrelation of residuals. Although gross domestic product expressed
in foreign currency (in American dollars) is the variable required by the
model, in this estimate we used gross domestic product as a dependent
variable, in kunas, at 1990 constant prices, since GDP figure in foreign
currency was not available. The elasticity of domestic real production with
respect to real effective exchange rate, E  is 0,26 percent. Coefficient of the
Y,e
real effective exchange rate has a negative sign, which satisfies the assumption
in Cohen's model, according to which domestic production is import
dependent, and this import dependency causes a negative relationship
between the exchange rate and gross domestic production (Cohen, 1988).
2.3 Croatia's ability to finance
its fiscal deficit
Using the calculated elasticities
E  = 0.34,
X*,e
E  = 1.32, and
X*,Y*





we applied the expression (13) and obtained the following value of
coefficient (:
( = 0.7766.
This value shows that the value of resources which should
be used to determine the size of  external indebtedness - and this value being
invariant with respect to the changes in the real effective exchange rate - can
be obtained as a linear combination of 77.66 percent of export value and
22.34 percent of domestic output value of the Republic of Croatia.
When elasticity values and coefficient gamma values are
obtained, and when the selected relevant export share in gross domestic
product is 22 percent, which is the actual share of goods exports of the
Republic of Croatia in the gross domestic product in 1998, so that
n = 0.22,
then we have obtained all entry data necessary to calculate a possible growth
rate of Croatian external debt, with the given growth rates of exports and
economic growth abroad. In accordance with expression (13) the rates of
Croatian export growth were calculated as the product of Croatian export
elasticities in relation to the output of importing countries, and of different
rates of economic growth in the Republic of Croatia.
In the model the rates of economic growth in domestic
economy and abroad feature as exogenously given values. Therefore for
obtaining the rates of acceptable increase in foreign debt it is necessary to
anticipate the feasible rates of economic growth in the country and abroad.
The real rates of economic growth in Croatia we chose as achievable lie
between 0 percent and 4 percent. With these growth rates in the country,
and with the existing Croatian export elasticity with respect to the production
of importing countries, we obtained the rates of export growth ranging
between -1.32 percent to 3.96 percent. Due to the already achieved high
level of economic development in importing countries, we assumed that their
real rates of economic growth would be somewhat lower, between -1 percent
and 3 percent. These are the assumptions on which the rates of growth of
resources R, i.e. nR in Croatia were calculated using the expression (14). The
results of these calculations can be found in Table 2. As we pointed out
earlier, the acceptable debt strategy will be considered the one at which
country's creditworthiness remains unchanged, i.e. those debt levels at which
the ratio of external debt to resources available for financing external debt,
is not rising. From this we derive the conclusion that a debt strategy is

















Figure 1 illustrates the past movements of relative debt
ratios of the Republic of Croatia, and shows the shares of total external debt
of the Republic of Croatia in exports, in gross domestic product, and in
resources. Since it was not possible to compare foreign debt figures in a
longer time period, only the figures from the preceding nine quarters were
used, in which the obligations towards London and Paris clubs were included
in the external debt. It can be noticed that a share of external debt, and
particularly of net external debt in the resource measure of the country was
significantly growing in the preceding nine quarters, which leads us to the
conclusion that the foreign debt strategy of that period had a negative impact





          Figure 2
          NET
          EXTERNAL
          DEBT OF THE
          REPUBLIC
          OF CROATIA
          WITH
          RESPECT
          TO EXPORTS,
          GROSS
          DOMESTIC
          PRODUCT
          AND
          RESOURCES
 
We know that, as shown in expression (16), deficit (in this
precise case the balance of trade deficit) equals the change in debt (here it is
the level of foreign debt) which, in turn, equals the product of debt growth
rate and debt in the previous period. Due to this equality the obtained
growth rates of external debt can, in accordance with expression (16), also be
interpreted as acceptable shares of foreign trade deficit in gross domestic
product of the Republic of Croatia, with the given rates of economic growth
in the country and abroad.
Thus the figures in Table 2 show that at the real rates of
economic growth in Croatia ranging from 0 percent to 4 percent, and at the
real rates of economic growth in importing countries ranging from -1 to 3
percent, foreign debt of the Republic of Croatia can grow between -0.57 and
3.98 percent per year. In other words, the share of foreign trade deficit in
gross domestic product of the Republic of Croatia, at the rates of economic
growth in the stated ranges, should be between -0.57 and 3.98 percent per
year, without increasing the share of foreign debt in the denominator of debt
indicator, which is invariant with respect to the changes in the real effective
exchange rate. With a combination of the rate of economic growth of, say, 1
percent in the Republic of Croatia, and the rate of economic growth of -1




should have a surplus in foreign trade if it wants that its share of foreign debt
in the value which is a linear combination of exports and output, remains
unchanged. If we chose a more realistic combination of growth rates, e.g. 1.5
percent in the Republic of Croatia and 1 percent abroad, foreign debt of the
Republic of Croatia could grow at the rate of 1.42 percent.
Table 2
ACCEPTABLE RATES OF FOREIGN DEBT GROWTH 
       Rates of growth -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
       in the country 
Rates of growth in
importing countries
          0 -0.57 -0.29 0.00 0.29 0.57 0.86 1.14 1.43 1.72
       0.5 -0.29 0.00 0.28 0.57 0.86 1.14 1.43 1.71 2.00
          1 -0.01 0.28 0.57 0.85 1.14 1.42 1.71 2.00 2.28
       1.5 0.28 0.56 0.85 1.14 1.42 1.71 1.99 2.28 2.57
          2 0.56 0.85 1.13 1.42 1.71 1.99 2.28 2.56 2.85
       2.5 0.84 1.13 1.42 1.70 1.99 2.27 2.56 2.85 3.13
          3 1.13 1.41 1.70 1.99 2.27 2.56 2.84 3.13 3.42
       3.5 1.41 1.70 1.98 2.27 2.56 2.84 3.13 3.41 3.70
          4 1.69 1.98 2.27 2.55 2.84 3.12 3.41 3.70 3.98
It can be seen that the estimated export demand equations
and the interdependence of gross domestic product and real effective
exchange rate in the Republic of Croatia indicate that the room for acceptable
debt is very restricted so that a very small debt increase of 4 percent can lead
to deteriorating of foreign creditworthiness of the Republic of Croatia. If we
look back several years ago, we see that the external debt of the Republic of
Croatia in 1997 increased by 39.2 percent in relation to 1996, in 1998 by
28.9 percent in relation to 1997. In 1999 the increase of external debt was
not so pronounced, but due to the kuna depreciation and the fall of the dollar
value of the exports, the share of external debt in GDP (i.e. in exports or in
the combination of GDP and exports) worsened. If the external debt ratio
continues to grow, creditworthiness of the Republic of Croatia will worsen
which could seriously weaken the possibility of getting a loan abroad. This
empirical research shows that a turnaround in macroeconomic policy is
necessary and urgent. Also domestic economy should stop the trend of
relying on foreign savings.
It will be repeated that the basic assumption of the present




if we assume that apart from the public sector there is the private sector
which can borrow abroad and has the need to borrow, then the room for
foreign public borrowing is very restricted. Namely, if all the sectors of the
Republic of Croatia can borrow abroad not more than 4 percent of GDP so
that the external debt share does not deteriorate, and if there is a need of the
private sector to borrow up to 2 percent of gross domestic product, the public
sector will be able to borrow only up to the remaining 2 percent of gross
domestic product.
Up to now we have been considering only the possibility
of financing the public sector through foreign debt and monetisation. Besides
these two methods, the government can be financed through domestic debt.
Hence when assessing the possibility of financing the public sector
consistently with other macroeconomic aims, domestic debt of the
government also has to be taken into account. Interest rates on the existing
domestic debt are very high and vary between 5 and 12 percent, averaging
5.4 percent. Interest rate on domestic instruments issued after 1993 are even
higher. Domestic debt is largely denominated in foreign currency and
through this is indexed, so we can say that the 5.4 percent interest rate almost
equals the real interest rate on domestic debt. With the interest rate of 5.4
percent and the rate of economic growth of, say, 3 percent, any more
intensive relying on financing through domestic debt would bring about the
explosion of costs of debt repayment expressed as a percentage of the gross
domestic product. We can conclude that with the existing rate of growth and
the interest rates on domestic public debt, domestic debt is not an appropriate
source of financing public consumption. Thus the maximum acceptable
amount of financing in the country would be the one which would not alter
the share of domestic public debt in GDP. With the 2 percent rate of
economic growth, the rate of increase of domestic debt or a deficit which is
financed by issuing public debt in the country could also be 2 percent of
gross domestic product without jeopardising the stability requirement of
domestic debt.
If we calculated feasible government revenues from
monetisation and acceptable financing of the government through debt, we
could come to a public sector deficit which would be consistent with the set
aims with respect to the rate of economic growth and inflation rate. Thus we
can notice that with rate of economic growth of 1.5 percent, with 1 percent
rate of economic growth abroad, and with the target inflation rate of 2
percent, financeable public sector deficit should not exceed 4.38 percent of
gross domestic product. This deficit can be considered the maximal upper
level of public sector debt since it is based on the assumption that it is




through debt is made available to the government. It is also assumed that the
government issues debt domestically in spite of the high interest rate on
domestic public debt.
With any other higher debt level economic disruptions
would occur which would threaten the realisation of macroeconomic policy.
If the government more heavily relied on foreign finances it would endanger
the possibility of repaying this very foreign debt. This would, in turn,
jeopardise the possibility of taking more loans abroad since foreign creditors
would perceive this danger, and that would bring down the creditworthiness
of the country. All of this could provoke shocks in the balance of payments
and necessitate changes in foreign currency rate which would additionally
threaten economic stability. Further reaching out for financing through
domestic debt would cause, as mentioned earlier, the growth in the share of
costs of debt repayment in gross domestic product and in the government
budget, and would leave less room for maneuver in achieving other public
sector tasks. It may also incur a new debt with the main purpose of financing
the repayment of the existing debt. Finally, monetary expansion, as the third
source of deficit financing, could have disastrous consequences for price
stability, and thereby for the stability of the overall economy, thus indirectly
threatening the ability of achieving the desired rate of growth.
3
CONCLUSION
Empirical analysis has shown that Croatia has limited
possibilities to finance its fiscal deficit. Foreign debt which up to now was
considered as an interesting possibility because of relatively low interest rates
and because of the availability of capital on foreign markets, is to a large
extent limited by dynamics of imports, which is the basic resource generator
for the repayment of foreign debt. The extent of financing the government
through domestic debt is limited by the low rate of growth of domestic
economy. Financing through issuing money should be avoided because of
possible inflationary effects. Thus we can conclude that in such conditions the
country should keep its consumption within the limits of collected revenues
since any other fiscal policy could produce serious problems in financing
fiscal deficit and in debt repayment, so that in the end it could endanger the
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Sargent, Thomas J. and Neil Wallace, 1981, "Some Unpleasant Monetarist
Arithmetics", Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Autumn
1981, pp. 1-17.
van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1990, "External Debt", Inflation and the Public Sector:
Toward Fiscal Policy for Sustainable Growth, The World Bank Economic
Review, vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 297-320.
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ESTIMATES OF BASE MONEY DEMAND FUNCTION





C -7.03 -7.25 -7.18 -6.18 -5.90
(t-stat.) (-2.61) (-2.56) (-2.98) (-4.02) (-4.53)
p -vrij. 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
logRM(-1) 0.49 0.60 0.61 0.43 0.39
(t-stat.) (5.27) (7.67) (9.06) (6.46) (8.50)
p -vrij. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
logY 1.08 1.01 1.00 1.06 1.05
(t-stat.) (3.74) (3.26) (3.79) (6.46) (7.20)
p -vrij. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
logINFLA 2.65 1.33 1.60 3.87 0.04
(t-stat.) (1.56) (0.80) (1.13) (3.90) (3.25)
p -vrij. 0.14 0.44 0.28 0.00 0.01
logIDV -5.88 -10.87 -0.36
(t-stat.) (-1.51) (-4.52) (-6.16)
p -vrij. 0.16 0.00 0.00
logIDO 2.40 3.51 0.17
(t-stat.) (1.88) (4.66) (6.60)
p -vrij. 0.08 0.00 0.00
logIDEP 0.38 -0.44
(t-stat.) (0.19) (-0.26)
p -vrij. 0.85 0.80
DUM3_95 0.12 0.16 0.18
(t-stat.) (2.51) (5.33) (6.60)
p -vrij. 0.03 0.00 0.00
R 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.995 0.9962
RKOR 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.993 0.9932
SGO 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
N 19 19 19 19 18
F 154.00 160.26 180.25 403.19 416.85
DW 1.52 1.25 0.98 2.26 2.39
* In this equation inflation variable is expressed in the form of a rate, so logINFLA=ln(B)=





ESTIMATES OF EXPORT DEMAND FUNCTION I





C 2.75 2.87 2.87 3.24 0.62
 (t-stat.) (1.28) (1.24) (1.34) (1.90) (0.20)
 p -vrij. 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.84
logUVOZ1 0.41
 (t-stat.) (2.00)
 p -vrij. 0.06
logUVOZ2 0.45
 (t-stat.) (1.95)
 p -vrij. 0.07
logUVOZ3 0.46
 (t-stat.) (1.95)
 p -vrij. 0.07
logUVOZ4 0.47
 (t-stat.) (2.28)
 p -vrij. 0.03
logUVOZIDA 0.45
 (t-stat.) (2.01)
 p -vrij. 0.05
logIRET 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.32
 (t-stat.) (1.96) (1.83) (1.81) (2.07) (2.00)
 p -vrij. 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06
logDEMDOL -0.88 -0.85 -0.84 -0.85 -0.80
 (t-stat.) (-3.24) (-3.20) (-3.20) (-3.31) (-3.15)
 p -vrij. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DUM1_93 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32
 (t-stat.) (-3.47) (-3.40) (-3.40) (-3.40) (-3.30)
 p -vrij. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DUM1_94 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44
 (t-stat.) (-4.14) (-4.14) (-4.14) (-4.14) (-4.34)
 p -vrij. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DUM3_94 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24
 (t-stat.) 2.69 2.69 2.69 2.69 (2.61)
 p -vrij. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
R 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.772
RKOR 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.712
SGO 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N 27 27 27 28 28
F 11.72 11.60 11.60 12.27 11.80





ESTIMATES OF EXPORT DEMAND FUNCTION II





C -6.83 -4.55 -4.74 -3.74 -15.24
 (t-stat.) (-1.07) (-0.77) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-1.39)
 p -vrij. 0.30 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.18
logBDP1 1.32
 (t-stat.) (2.17)
 p -vrij. 0.04
logBDP2 1.22
 (t-stat.) (1.96)
 p -vrij. 0.06
logBDP3 1.26
 (t-stat.) (1.97)
 p -vrij. 0.06
logBDP4 1.37
 (t-stat.) (2.26)
 p -vrij. 0.03
logBDPIDA 1.62
 (t-stat.) (-2.02)
 p -vrij. 0.06
LogIRET 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.25
 (t-stat.) (2.10) (1.88) (1.87) (2.01) (1.76)
 p -vrij. 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09
logDEMDOL -0.93 -0.85 -0.84 -0.85 -0.81
 (t-stat.) (-3.38) (-3.21) (-3.21) (-3.30) (-3.12)
 p -vrij. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
DUM1_93 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.31
 (t-stat.) (-3.54) (-3.44) (3.40) (-3.40) (-3.22)
 p -vrij. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DUM1_94 -0.42 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.45
 (t-stat.) (-4.12) (4.16) (-4.21) (-4.27) (-4.39)
 p -vrij. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DUM3_94 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24
 (t-stat.) (2.74) (2.68) (2.65) (2.70) (2.59)
 p -vrij. 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
R 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.772
RKOR 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.702
SGO 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
N 27 27 27 28 28
F 12.15 11.62 11.64 12.23 11.61






) changes in values 
t period




b share of public debt in output
B public debt held by the central bank
C
B public debt at held by the private sector
P
B total public debt
T
D conventional fiscal deficit
d share of conventional fiscal deficit in output
E nominal exchange rate
e real exchange rate
F foreign exchange reserves held by the central bank
C
G current expenditures of the public sector
GOT currency in circulation
i nominal interest rate on domestic public debt 
D
i nominal interest rate on savings and term deposits 
DO
i nominal interest rate on sight deposits
DV
i nominal interest rate on external debt
L
K total direct central bank credits
C
L total external debt
L net external debt
N
m share of base money in output
M base money
0




PB primary balance of the government budget (primary deficit)
PSD required deficit reduction
R resource measure based on GDP and exports data 
r real interest rate on domestic public debt
D





( weight for exports
n share of goods exports in output
B inflation rate
